The Uncivil Service (Chapter 6)

Citizen JournalistBy gferren, New West Unfiltered 1-20-08

Chapter 6: Destroying the Basis (Justification) for the Detail, Extended Detail, and Subsequent Directed Reassignment, Another Look at the Administrative Review Team Report (and a copy that is not redacted)

[(This is where the Admin Review Team Report undergoes further Analysis and is again Discredited. Without a basis for moving me to MSO, everything that followed - my so-called "misconduct", is also invalid. Try to think of events with the if-then-else logic computer programmers use to setup a logical flow of events and actions. If the report is wrong (and it is very very wrong), then the action - of moving me to MSO, is also wrong and each event sets into motion a subsequent flow of actions… those being Singer's acts of reprisal and my responses.)]

[Ask yourself…What's wrong with this picture? I started at MCFO as a computer assistant and progressed through years of hard work and service to become the lead computer specialist/systems administrator. I have many performance awards, pa's signed off by both Singer and Murphy. But suddenly, there is a "need" for a administrative review team report regarding my "performance". And strangely, this review is necessary not too long after I make the EEO statement in support of Janet Edmonds containing my negative commentary regarding Singer and Murphy.
In truth, Murphy and Singer had come to fear what I might reveal about their collusion and efforts to push Janet Edmonds aside. Singer was pissed at Janet E. over a previous disagreement and Murphy was unhappy with Janet E. because she wasn't a "yes man" employee to his form of leadership. Being an idea man, every bullshit idea of his wasn't enthusiastically embraced by those of us that actually had to do the real work of keeping the MCFO running and performing its basic functions …public land management services to the public.]

[(Scanned complete admin review team report, attachments to the report were not provided to me - GF, I will make some commentary clarification in the document below…it won't be nice.)]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
1849 C STREET NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240
In Reply Refer To:
1242, 1400-735 (WO-S0O)
To: Deputy State Director for Support Services Montana State Office
From: Richard H. Hotaling, Manager Malta Field Office
Sandy Powell, Personnel Management Specialist National Interagency Fire Center
Ruth Welch, Management Analyst Information Resources Management
Subject: IRM Review of the Miles City Field Office, January 19-22, 1999
January 28, 1999
As requested, please find attached the final report for your information, review, and action. If you would like to discuss this report with us further, please contact Ruth Welch at (303) 236-1783, and she will schedule a conference call.
Thank you for the opportunity to work on this review. If there is an opportunity for us to assist you in
cc: L. Hamilton (MT-910)
Gordon, CIO (WO-500)
Hotaling (Malta Field Office)
Powell (FA-202)
MILES CITY FIELD OFFICE
INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
CUSTOMER SERVICE AND PROGRAM REVIEW
By Rick Hotaling Sandy Powell Ruth Welch
January 1999

The Deputy Director for Support Services at the Montana State Office (MSO), Janet Singer, requested a review of the IRM program at the Miles City Field Office (MCFO), specifically, the level of customer service the internal customers were receiving. In addition, Ms. Singer requested that the evaluation of the program include information in the following three areas:

[(Strangely - Singer requested no such review of any other MT BLM office's IRM program)]

- Should the MCFO Systems Administrator remain at the MCFO?
- Is the MCFO Computer Assistant capable of performing customer service and basic computer applications support to the MCFO?
- Is the MCFO Administrative Officer performing the IRM administrative responsibilities fairly and adequately?
In order to gather information sufficient for Ms. Singer to make decisions on the above issues, a team of specialists was tasked with performing the IRM program review. The team consisted of the following members:

[(Singer put together this team, in lieu of using a bureau team that is specifically trained in performing such reviews…these folks didn't have that training or skills.)]

Richard M. (Rick) Hotaling, Manager, Malta Field Office
Sandy Powell, Personnel Management Specialist, National Interagency Fire Center
Ruth Welch, Management Analyst, Information Resources Management
The team convened at the Montana State Office on Tuesday, January 19, 1999. Ms. Singer provided the introductory interview, information (Appendices 1 and 4), and guidance to the team. The team then met with Glenn Ferren, Systems Administrator for the MCFO (currently on a 60-day detail to the MSO) who provided the team with a package of information (Appendix 2), and with Robin Stoebe, IRM Chief for the Montana State Office.
On Wednesday and Thursday, January 20-21, 1999, the team met with the MCFO Manager and Associate Manager, the IRM staff, MCFO supervisors and team leads (documentation provided by Todd Christensen is contained in Appendix 3), and customers (a complete listing of persons interviewed is contained in Attachment 1). On Friday, January 22, 1999, the team met with several MSO IRM personnel and provided a closeout briefing for Ms. Singer and Larry Hamilton, State Director, Montana.

[(The only MCFO IRM staff they met with was Tammy Watts, Jerry French was omitted)]

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Security of the Miles City computer systems (UNIX, PC, and Internet/Intranet)

Family Members Using BLM Systems and Software
On two separate occasions, Mr. Ferren allowed family members access to the MCFO computer system and the Internet/Intranet. In addition, the family members were using the equipment unsupervised by himself or another BLM employee. After the first occasion in October or November 1998, Mr. Ferren was counseled verbally by his supervisor, Janet Edmonds, and he said that he would "stop their use of the PC" (Attachment 2). Mr. Ferren believes that at some point a policy was issued within Montana regarding the use of the Internet/Intranet by family members. No one else the team interviewed remembered such a policy and no written policy was discovered by the team.

[(Note first reference to Internet/Intranet…these poor confused fools never could figure out the difference in a web browser on the public Internet as versus access to an internal Intranet…the supposed IRM person on the team couldn't even recognize browser startup (constructed pages of html links) pages)]

There is specific Department of the Interior, Bureau, and Montana State Internet policy guidance (Instruction Memorandum No. MT-98-010) that is very clear in that only full time Department of the Interior Employees, volunteers who are authorized to use Departmental resources to access the Internet, and Departmental contractors who are authorized to use government-owned equipment or facilities may access the Internet (Attachment 3, p.5). Mr. Ferren felt that unless policy was issued that directly covered Internet access at the MCFO, he did not have to comply with the Department’s, BLM’s, or Montana’s current Internet policy. Mr. Ferren, in an E-mail to Ms. Singer dated December 16, 1998, requested "that you (Janet Singer) issue a confirming directive document and re-issue the related IM/IB's that address this issue. I have no problem conforming MCFO local Internet access security policy to existing BLM Internet Access/Use Policy should our policy be in conflict." (Attachment 4). The Bureau’s Internet policy, Instruction Memorandum No. 97-177, clearly states that "supervisors may institute necessary limitations on Internet use by employees or contractors." (Attachment 3, p.3)

[(Not a little biased huh…"felt…he did not have to comply…", but then they contradict the statement by reference to my email where I say…"I have no problem conforming …should our policy be in conflict".)]

In December 1998, Aden Seidlitz, Associate Manager, discovered Mr. Ferren’s cousin using the same PC and accessing the Internet. Mr. Seidlitz was unable to locate Mr. Ferren and sent Ms. Edmonds an E-mail message (Attachment 5) citing the second unauthorized use of government equipment by a member of Mr. Ferren’s family. Again, Ms. Edmonds counseled Mr. Ferren verbally regarding family members accessing the lnternet/Intranet from BLM computer terminals. In an E-mail message from Mr. Ferren to Ms. Edmonds dated December 16, 1998 (Attachment 6), Mr. Ferren says that he "[has] done nothing wrong", feels that he made "a correct interpretation of BLM’s current Internet Use Policy", and that these actions were not a "Security Issue."
Crack Program Used to Identify Montana Users’ Passwords
Mr. Ferren downloaded the Crack program from the Internet, applied the program to the Montana systems, and the result was knowledge of many Montana user passwords. Mr. Ferren stated that
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he did this out of curiosity and that he did inform the Montana Security Officer, Asko Virtanen, of his finding that Montana users had their systems secured with badly formed passwords. Ms. Singer’s password was given to Mr. Virtanen at that time, but Mr. Virtanen did not consider this an issue or a breech of security. Several weeks later, Mr. Virtanen informed Ms. Singer that Mr. Ferren knew her password.

[(Montana IRM Security Officer - Asko Virtanen "did not consider this an issue or a breech of security")]

Security of Group Wise E-mail
Many of the managers and employees that were interviewed by the team said that they were uncomfortable with minimal or non-existent security of the Group Wise E-mail system. Five people interviewed said that they suspected that their or other’s personal E-mail In and Out boxes and messages bad been accessed without their knowledge or authorization, read by Mr. Ferren, and possibly passed on to other employees, including Ms. Edmonds.

[(Their email could have been read by any number of people, allowing proxy (allowing others to read their email) access to email was a common practice by these folks concerned with email "security") All system administrators in the MT BLM had access to and did access user email accounts. The State Office system administrator, Park Richard, even kept copies of the default email passwords for email users and special email accounts when Lotus Notes was installed…allowing access to ALL email accounts in the Montana Dakotas BLM)]

Possible Access of Non-BLM Persons to the BLM Intranet via the MCFO Intranet
There is a possibility that requires further investigation by the Bureau Security Manager, of non-BLM persons accessing the Intranet via links established on the Miles City Intranet page. There are multiple links from the MCFO Intranet Homepage to non-government sites, personal sites, and inappropriate sites. The team is concerned that since BLM employees can access these sites, there may be a chance that others may enter the BLM Intranet from those sites. In addition, some of the sites were considered by the team to be blatantly racial, sexual, and violent, and fully inappropriate for inclusion on a government Intranet site (Appendix 5).

[(These dull and dumb, pathetic and possibly mentally challenged, computer and internet uneducated team members are talking about something that never existed at Miles City…an Intranet server and Intranet web page. Their "consideration" of what they saw (html links) could very well have been disconcerting and scary…kinda like the first caveman's reaction to looking at the stars)]

II. System Administration Technical Support of the Miles City Computer Systems
Technical Management of the MCFO Systems

The overall configuration of the MCFO computer system and network is very effective and operational 99% of the time. Mr. Ferren is considered to be "the best" systems administrator in the state of Montana by his peers at the other Field Offices and the State Office. The system is run efficiently within budgetary allocations and is up and running as consistently, if not more so, than any of the other field systems within the Montana network.

[(The paragraph above about sums it up…no longer doing user level duties, but doing system level administration duties at a high performance level - I ensured that MCFO had the best computer systems in the MT BLM…this included hardware, software, peripherals and maximum uptime availability of all components)]

Customers are Locked Out of the Computers
Mr. Ferren stated that "in an effort to control Miles City user end runs to MSO IRM staff for support, and to prevent MSO IRM staff from providing this support without notifying MC IRM staff of their actions and of the MC end users needs", Robert Mitchell was locked out of his system during business and non-business hours. Specifically, in an E-mail message (Attachment 7) from Mr. Ferren to Ms. Edmonds and Todd Christensen dated October 20, 1998, Mr. Ferren wrote:

[(Total bullshit, Robert Mitchell was curtailed to an 8 to 5 login because he kept trying to fill up a shared file system with files that belonged on the web server at MSO (Billings), two totally separate issues. MSO IRM didn't need access to MCFO and I didn't need access to MSO. Not something new, we had been doing business this way since our first network (Novell) circa 1994-95)]

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"I hope that this sort of response had been corrected. Robert is currently curtailed to his 250 and associated x-terminals. His login is normal, with the exception of no login on the weekend. When I am sure that the attitude problem is corrected, and that Robert is a ‘team’ player and will not cause problems on this system, I will relinquish the access locks on his login."
Mr. Ferren made these decisions of his own accord and with the full knowledge and support of Ms. Edmonds. When Ms. Edmonds was asked by Mr. Christensen, Mr. Mitchell’s supervisor, if she knew of this, she said yes. It was also brought to Mr. Christensen’s attention by Mr. Mitchell that he was locked out of his system from 7:00 a.m. until 8:00 a.m., or until Mr. Ferren reported to work each day and unlocked Mr. Mitchell’s system. Ms. Edmonds had Mr. Ferren removed the morning lock from Mr. Mitchell’s system, but he continued to be locked out in the evenings and on weekends (Attachment 8).

[("made these decisions"…sorry hon, but that's what system administrators do. The locks were automated and a schedule was setup for Robert. Give me a break, there's supposed to be a computer literate person on this "team")]

Shut Down of Computers
The team documented one instance where Mr. Ferren shut down Mr. Mitchell’s system explaining to another employee that Mr. Mitchell had been on the system too long. This shut down occurred without explaining to or notifying Mr. Mitchell first. In an E-mail from Mr. Mitchell to Mr. Christensen, dated October 26, 1998 (Attachment 9), the following information was documented:
"...Ferren told [Will] Hubbell that ‘Mitchell was the only other one on the system and that I [Mitchell] had been on long enough, and that he [Ferren] would bring that system down without contacting me [Mitchell]."

[(This stuff is coming from R. Mitchell…might warrant a little skepticism from a truly unbiased review team, don't you think?…but here it's portrayed as gospel, as undoubtedly true cause Robert said it happened.)]

Deleting and Moving Users Files and Programs from Personal Computers
On several occasions Mr. Ferren moved working files between servers and directories. The files were moved without permission of the file owner, and no explanation was given either before or after moving the files. In addition, once the files were moved, the user was no longer able to access them (Attachment 10). Mr. Ferren was moving these files and denying access to them without Ms. Edmonds’ knowledge. When Ms. Edmonds was asked about this by Mr. Christensen, she said in an E-mail to Mr. Ferren, "Please tell me we didn’t do this - please, please, please! !" (Attachment 11). Mr. Ferren denied removing the files in this instance, saying in an E-mail back to Mr. Murphy, "No files removed. ..believe this would be OE [operator error] ...Roberts’."(Attachment 11).

[(More whining and crying by Robert Mitchell, and Janet was just tired of the bullshit from Mitchell and Christensen. The files were moved to where they belonged and Tammy Watts was given ownership, she was working with Mitchell at the time on web page construction…that'd be Intranet web pages on the MSO Intranet web server located at the BLM State Office in Billings Montana)]

In another instance, Mr. Ferren completely deleted an entire wildlife database that was being utilized by Dale Tribby. The database was housed on a stand-alone personal computer.
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Mr. Ferren made it known that he did not support the stand-alone PC and that he did not like Mr. Tribby working on it. During Mr. Tribby’s absence, Mr. Ferren removed the PC on the auspice that it needed fixing, although no one had requested service, and completely erased everything on the computer. When Mr. Tribby asked if any of the data had been saved, Mr. Ferren said that it had and gave Mr. Tribby several diskettes. When Mr. Tribby opened the diskettes, they were empty - the years of accumulated wildlife data that was contained within the database was lost When Mr. Ferren was confronted regarding the lost data, he had no response, saying that it was not his problem.

[A data steward is the person responsible for a particular database, Tribby was the person responsible for the wildlife database referenced here. He had also received probably three requests from Norma Smith (MSO) for that data during the transition to Informix databases. Tribby was aware that the PC needed "fixing" as I mentioned in the reference to social engineering previously. Tribby had the data, Tribby lost the data, Tribby is responsible and should grow a pair and accept that responsibility. I have no sympathy for a person like Dale Tribby, a little less whining and a little more effort on his part would solve a lot of his "problems".]

Sufficient Systems Administration Backup Support
The Montana Field Offices (Butte, Dakotas, Lewiston, and Miles City) provide systems administration backup support to each other during planned and unplanned absences. The systems administrators at these offices, Lynn Ridl, Steve Brandenburg, Greg Pederson, and Mr. Ferren, work closely together to help each other with problems and concerns and to provide backup as necessary to each other. It is understood by all four offices that if their lead system administrator is out of the office they can call one of the other three lead systems administrators for support. The Field Offices do not share their root passwords with the State Office, and at times do not share their root passwords with each other. At each of the other Field Offices, the lead systems administrator shares the root password with their immediate backup. Mr. Ferren does not share his root password with anyone at the MCFO. This raised a concern with the review team, in that if Mr. Ferren is out of the office, it could take hours before someone could be contacted that would be able to fix a problem. If one of Mr. Ferren’s backups, either Tammy Watts or Jerry French, had the password, they would be able to call the MSO and have one of the systems administrators fix the problem immediately. In addition to not providing Ms. Watts or Mr. French with the root password, Mr. Ferren is not training either person to assist with everyday administration of the system. Neither is prepared to step in and provide support to the MCFO in Mr. Ferren’s absence. Mr. Ferren explained that this is because Ms. Watts is not able to provide that level of support and that the one time he did leave her to perform some basic backup functions in his absence, she disabled a machine. After further research, the team concluded that Ms. Watts did cause a system problem while performing some backup duties, but that this was five years ago and it was the first time she had performed that function. Since that accident five years ago, Mr. Ferren has not allowed Ms. Watts to learn, practice, or perform even basic user support and systems maintenance functions. Ms. Watts is very interested in learning how to effectively perform her duties as Computer Assistant, but needs to receive the proper training, guidance, mentoring, and support. Currently, she is receiving none of these things.

[Ok, you morons…I had no system administrator backup at MCFO. Jerry French was in the process of receiving AIX UNIX training and would have assumed that backup position in time. Tammy Watts was also receiving BLM training courses, as a computer assistant doing software support. It was not my job to train either person, never was in my job description. The incident that occurred, at the time of the review, had occurred less than two years previously not five years as these idiots state. Tammy was getting training, so the bs about poor poor Tammy not getting training is just that …bullshit!]

The Intranet Server at the MCFO - After much debate, the MCFO bought a nine-gigabyte server for their Internet/Intranet site. The server is only used for Internet/Intranet data and is separate from the rest of the MCFO network
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Mr. Ferren decided that the Internet Team could only have access to 2 gigabytes on the server and locked the server from further use by the Internet Team (Attachment 12). Mr. Ferren did this without discussing it with the Internet Team or working with the team to access their requirements for space for their site. In addition, on October 1, 1998, Mr. Mitchell requested that Mr. Ferren "...not move any files to the web server! These are not your files - leave them alone!" (Attachment 13). Mr. Ferren responded by instructing Mr. Mitchell to "comply with my system admin related directives or (ALL) your access to this system will be terminated. Reply to this msg that you understand and will comply or I will terminate your access effective COB today." (Attachment 14)

[The level of stupidity of this "team" still amazes me (7) years later. There never was an Intranet server at MCFO. A Nine gigabyte harddrive is not a server and was specially purchased to give Robert Mitchell room to store his graphic files (usually pictures of himself and Tim Murphy) because MCFO mgmt did not have the common sense or the balls to make him use the disk space and server specifically deployed at MSO for the field offices to use. The "Internet team" referenced here would be better stated as Robert Mitchell. F**k Robert Mitchell, I gave that pathetic waste enough space to start his file storage and left the option then to expand that space as needed or to create new file systems on that hard drive…per standard AIX Unix procedure]

III. Customer Service Quality of Customer Service by the MCFO
During the interview process, the team asked each person to rate the level of service received by the MCFO IRM staff on a scale of 1 (unacceptable) to 5 (exceptional). The majority of those interviewed rated Mr. Ferren’s customer service as 1 or 2. Mr. French and Ms. Watts received ratings between 3 and 5. The exception was those staff that are personal friends of Mr. Ferren. They all rated his quality of customer service at the level 5. The customer service received from the MSO at the MCFO was also rated as very high. For the most part, the only people directly contacting the MSO are the IRM staff. This is due partly because of the nature of their work and partly because Mr. Ferren sent an E-mail to all of the MCFO staff last year that directed them to not contact the MSO IRM staff, but to only contact the MCFO IRM staff. Most of the employees at the MCFO have complied with Mr. Ferren’s request.

[If you interview people that are chicken shit and feel that someone should hold their hands or do their work for them, then I can see the 1 or 2 rating…the Robert Mitchell's, Dale Tribby's, Tim Murphy's. Those would be people that expect everyone to be their servant, rather than their coworker, there were a few of those types at MCFO. Remember that my primary duty was now systems administration and not user support. I wonder how the team determined who were "personal friends of Mr. Ferren"? A rare talent considering their lack of ability to logically collect factual information, keep it in order, and perform a competent "review".]

Level of Customer Service
The staff at the MCFO are very frustrated with the level of customer service they receive. They are often refused assistance, products, and instruction/training. Many times Mr. Ferren will not respond to telephone calls, or answer the telephone even when he is at his desk. He will not walk users through functional steps in order to show them how to operate software programs that they need to know in order to perform their job. If he does show them how to do things he is curt, rude, and will not answer questions. He will not provide basic products, such as diskettes or printer toner cartridges, to the users. He will also not provide standard, Bureauwide software products to customers unless he feels that they need them. Many times, the products that he does offer customers are only portions of the software’s capabilities, and not what the user needs to finish tasks or work assignments. Most of the customers that the team interviewed have gone out on their own and purchased computer products and services with their own money in order to have the tools that they need to perform their job. These purchases range from boxes of diskettes to software packages to laptops and entire operating systems that they use at home. Most of the customers are so fed up with the level of customer service that they no longer even ask for assistance, they call software vendors directly or other computer specialists in other offices for assistance. Many work at home in order to utilize the software and equipment that they need Page 6 of 9
to get the job done. All of this work is being done with the full knowledge of the impacted employees’ immediate supervisors, who are also just as frustrated with the level of customer service provided.

[Too much bullshit in the above paragraph…I wasn't doing direct user support, except as an addition to my system admin duties. The system took precedence over low level problems and the end users did have to assume some responsibility to learn the system and software they used daily. This came about through their daily use, some training materials they were provided, and through assistance by myself, French, and Watts. Some users did buy software and materials for use at home, when they weren't allowed to take home government purchased software for installation on government computers and load it on their personal computers. Those would be the Kathy Bockness's and Hubert Livingston's and the like.]

The managers at the MCFO have brought up this unacceptable level of customer service to the attention of Mr. Ferren’s supervisor, Ms. Edmonds, but she has refused to address or even acknowledge that there is not a problem.
The situation that was brought to the team’s attention involved the ordering of a scanner that would scan slides. The MCFO already possessed a scanner that would scan sheets of paper. The entire MCFO organization contributed funds to purchase the slide scanner for the Resources Division. The program specialists picked out the scanner, prepared the requisition, and had it approved by the MCFO manager, Mr. Murphy. The requisition then went to Mr. Ferren, who, without discussing the order with the resources staff, Mr. Christensen, Mr. Murphy, or Ms. Edmonds, changed the requisition and ordered a scanner that is very similar to the one that they already have. Currently, the scanner will not scan slides and has been sent to the MSO IRM staff in an attempt to reconfigure the scanner so that it will meet the customers needs and scan slides.
According the MSO lead computer specialists, Park Richard, Kevin Brooks, and Asko Virtanen, all requisitions for MT IRM equipment need to be sent through MT IRM in order to ensure that the equipment to be ordered meets Bureau standards, will work with the current equipment, and that the customer is really getting the best product for their needs. If any of the above criteria are not met, the IRM staff discusses these concerns with the requisitioner, IRM management, or program management (the manger paying for the equipment). The IRM role in the procurement process is one of recommendation. IRM does not have the authority to change requisitions, they can only make technical recommendations. Mr. Ferren had no authority to change the requisition at any point during the ordering of the scanner.

[I did have the authority at MCFO to ensure that equipment had the proper specifications and I could and did change procurement orders if they were improperly written. Hubert Livingston had a bad habit of buying the first dog and pony show offering from any software vendor…when he could get away with it. Once, while I was gone on training, he even had a computer salesman in Miles City install software on a BLM computer and register the software license to the salesman. What the IRM staff at MSO did with procurement had no bearing on the procedures at MCFO.]

IV. Management of the IRM Function at the Miles City Field Office
The review team found several areas of concern in the management of the IRM function at the MCFO. Ms. Edmonds, Mr. Ferren’ s immediate supervisor, and the supervisor of the IRM functions, the budget procurement function, and the operations staff at MCFO, has refused to admit that there is a problem with Mr. Ferren’s job performance and has not addressed his inappropriate behavior.

[(Refer back to "best systems administrator" in the Montana Dakotas BLM, Ms. Edmonds was smart enough to recognize what I was doing and I appreciate her support.)]

Ms. Edmonds is aware of how Mr. Ferren controls the IRM functions in the office and has given him blanket authority to make any and all decisions regarding the system, network, customer service, product management, and the training of Ms. Watts. When conflicts have arisen
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between Mr. Ferren and other MCFO employees, Ms. Edmonds has refused to admit that there is a problem and has not taken any actions to correct the behavior that has led to the problems with the other employees.
During individual work station downs and MCFO system downs, Ms. Edmond’s response is that it is "not her problem" or to "wait until Glenn returns." This is sometimes an hour or two, but has also been as long as four business days.

[(An x-terminal is the only thing that I can think of that might have been down for (4) days, awaiting parts for a hardware repair, in that case the user had a 250 host or one or two other x-terms to login into or any other Unix box in the office. No one was ever without access to computers or the network.)]

Ms. Edmonds has allowed Mr. Ferren carte blanche control of the system including management of user profiles and access to Bureauwide standard software and peripherals. Mr. Ferren is the only Montana systems administrator that has controlled each MCFO employees’ computer configuration to such a degree that employees can not access any or part of Bureau wide approved software applications, they can not change their screen colors or savers, and they can not add or delete software programs (and Mr. Ferren will not add or delete software programs even at the user’s or supervisor’s request).

[MCFO (nor any other MT/Dakotas BLM employees) employees never had the authority to add or delete software programs. All bureau-approved programs available in Montana were available in Miles City and installed and configured to perform their function. If you have time to screw around with screen savers and colors, your manager should be giving you some real work to do.]

Another area of concern is the fact that Ms. Edmonds was forwarding E-mail from Mr. Seidlitz and Ms. Singer to Mr. Ferren that was considered sensitive, personnel related, and documented concerns each of them had regarding Mr. Ferren’s behavior. Mr. Ferren replied back to the original sender, who in both cases, did not realize that he knew of their correspondence.

[Like to talk about other people…but don't think they should know it? Become a BLM mgr.]

Additionally, Ms. Edmonds counseled Mr. Ferren verbally regarding the second instance involving Mr. Ferren’s family members using the BLM computer equipment and accessing the Internet sites. Ms. Singer had sent Ms. Edmonds an E-mail on December 8, 1998, stating that the two of them needed to discuss the incident (Attachment 15) and verbally requested that Ms. Edmonds not counsel Mr. Ferren until she had investigated all of the issues and concerns that she had regarding Mr. Ferren’s behavior. Ms. Edmonds is quoted in an E-mail from Ms. Singer to Diane Friez, dated December 17, 1998, that "she [Ms. Edmonds] sent the e-mail messages from Aden and me [Ms. Singer] to Glenn so that he would understand that the concerns were being raised by someone above her [Ms. Edmonds]." (Attachment 16).
Several of Ms. Edmonds’ employees, but not Mr. Ferren, feel that her treatment of them is inconsistent. She is supportive of them one minute and yells at them the next. They are never sure what the "rules" are for a particular day and are scared that she may react violently if they go against her wishes, either purposefully or accidentally.

[Generalization, "several of", meaning could have been Tammy Watts or Kass Portra, both of whom screwed up on regular occasions. The rules were always the same, come to work and do your job…leave the bs and drama at the door. Not hard to understand. Why would they purposefully go against her wishes? Maybe they wanted to be chiefs and not Indians?]

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The purpose of this program review was to gather information sufficient for Ms. Singer and Mr. Hamilton to make any necessary decisions regarding the management and level of customer service within the IRM program at the Miles City District Office. Therefore, this report will not contain formal recommendations for action, but the team would like to answer the three questions posed to them at the beginning of the review by Ms. Singer:

[Sounds like recommendations to me, thanks for your "unbiased" opinions - stick 'em up you’re a** please.]

Question 1. Should the MCFO Systems Administrator remain at the MCFO?
As outlined in the major findings of the report, Mr. Ferren is not providing adequate customer service and has breached any level of trust between himself and the MCFO management and users. For these reasons, Mr. Ferren should not return to the Miles City Field Office. The MCFO will need to replace Mr. Ferren with a qualified systems administrator to support that office and the other offices within the Eastern Zone.

[Your report is pure BullShit and so is your answer to this question.]

Question 2. Is the MCFO Computer Assistant capable of performing customer service and basic computer applications support to the MCFO?
Through the interview process and the outlined major findings, the review team has concluded that Ms. Watts is a highly capable, intelligent, motivated employee that is more than willing and able to perform the duties required by a Computer Assistant, GS-3 -5. With adequate formal training, on-the-job training, and guidance, Ms. Watts would be able to provide excellent customer service, applications (software) maintenance, and user support to the employees at MCFO within a years time.

[With (2) years of experience and training already, another year certainly wouldn't hurt. And she'd still be doing the same job that she was doing while Janet E and I were at MCFO…customer service, software support, and user support. But then there was that problem with her husband and his boss's money, their spending lots of that money at the casinos and buying wave runners and the like, and then the Courts and charges…]

Question 3. Is the MCFO Administrative Officer performing the IRM administrative responsibilities fairly and adequately?
The findings have shown that there are some serious questions regarding the supervision of the IRM support functions provided by Ms. Edmonds. This is only a portion of her total responsibilities as the Administrative Officer for the Eastern Zone, including the MCFO. This report should be followed by a more formal administrative review of the functions that fall within Ms. Edmonds area of responsibility.

[Janet was doing an excellent job in all her duties…in spite of the efforts of Tim Murphy and Janet Singer to farm off her duties to Assistant District Manager Aden Seidlitz and to lessen her role as the Administrative Officer at the MCFO. Janet Edmonds is the rare manager in government service, one who actually can and will perform her duties and produce a product or service. Tim Murphy is an "idea" man, the type that farms off work and makes bs work for people that already have plenty to do. Janet Singer was just conniving and sneaky, the type of person managers like Larry Hamilton keep around to spy on the troops and stir up shit. She really had no valid function, and was the kind of manager that many were glad to see retire.]

Page 9 of 9

[(Ruth Welch supposedly knew something about IRM…that was a joke. She was nothing more than a pencil pusher with no IRM tech knowledge, skills, or ability)]

Ruth Welch 12/01/99 03:02 PM
To: Robin Stoebe/MTSO/MT/BLM/DOI@BLM cc: Janet Singer/MTSO/MT/BLM/DOl @ BLM
Subject: Requested Info
Hi Robin,
As I recall you contacted me first to see if I would be interested in a personnel/IRM review as a special project. I said yes. Then we discussed dates and I told you I would be in Mexico the week of January 11. You didn’t think that was a problem. I then talked several times about dates with Janet’s secretary. I did not talk to Janet directly about the project until we interviewed her on 1/19/99.
I have only met Janet one other time, during the IRM Functional Review in 1996 when Ned Preston Chris North and I interviewed all of the Montana IRM staff, some customers, and selected management officials.
Hope this is what you are looking for. Call me if you need anything else.
Ruth
mt—janets—interview.wpc

Interview Notes from 1/19/99, 2:00 p.m. with Janet Singer, DSD, at the Montana State Office.
Janet discussed the following with Rick Hotaling. Sandy Powell, and me:
June 1998 - Montana moved to 2-tier organization. There is an Admin Officer at each office that reports to Janet Singer. In Miles City the Admin Officer is Janet Edmonds. In September 1998 there were reports of IRM problems at Miles City. There have also been conflicts between Tim Murphy and Janet E.
In October 1998 the issues with Glenn Ferren were brought up by Tim. Glenn’s office is in the library (at Glenn’s request). Glenn’s nephew and son were caught using government equipment in the library with the door locked. Glenn was in Billings at the time. Glenn gave them access. The boys were accessing the Internet. Glenn was verbally counseled by Tim.
There have been conflicts in the MCDO with web page space, access (Glenn locks out the web coordinator), and Glenn places unnecessary restrictions on computer use by Robert Mitchell.
There have been conflicts over the new web servers needed/required for the web pages.
In December 1998 another access issue - Glenn’s cousin was caught using a government computer. Glenn wasn’t around. Documentation from Janet S. to Asko and Robin on security issues and accessing government computers by non-BLM employees.
Glenn bragged to Asko that he had his and Janet Singer’s passwords. Asko wrote Janet’s password down and gave it her, asking if it was indeed her password. It was. Glenn also had other Montana employee’s passwords.
Glenn’s actions were inappropriate. He does not seem to have concern for BLM or the security of the system.
Glenn’s rationale - As a systems administrator, he can give anyone access. Montana has a family friendly work environment. Glenn was "Computer King" and made access decisions for people without their, or management’s, input.
Some of Janet Singer’s questions -

Did Glenn receive this direction from the Admin Officer (Janet E.)?

Does Janet E. agree with Glenn because she doesn’t know any better?

Janet E. isn’t a good communicator.

[(Doesn't sound like a question, sounds like a statement of opinion)]

Is Janet E. doing her job? Or is Glenn disregarding her authority?

The outcome from this review that Janet Singer would like to have-Information as to whether Glenn should have root access. Is his judgement sound?

[(read between the lines…Should Glenn have root access, What will he reveal about me or Tim Murphy? Glenn has aligned himself with Janet Edmonds, lets break that line of support and separate the two.)]

Glenn hasn’t followed the rules for domiciling his government vehicle over the weekends (is this another blatant disregard for authority that plays into the above questions/concerns?).
Glenn was supposed to be mentoring Tammy Watts. Is Glenn training her well? Tammy has been a computer assistant for 3 years.

[Janet Singer pulled this one right out of her ass…never was, never had been, never would have been a mentor to Tammy Watts. Check the job descriptions.]

What are the appropriate consequences for not following Montana’s and BLM’s computer procedures, even after verbal counseling? (Janet Singer will decide these after the review)
Janet Singer’s three issues:
1. Glenn’s conduct. He needs to follow the rules set by management.
2. There are problems with the management of the IRM program at Miles City.
3. Tammy Watts - is she capable of providing IRM support to the Miles City office?

[(Why Tammy Watts ? - Jerry French was the 2nd in line for systems and user support. No concern or acknowledgement of Jerry's role or of his skills, Why is Singer so intent on helping out poor Tammy? Remember, Tammy got the computer assistant position over better qualified applicants after MSO took away most of her personnel clerk duties.)]

Janet Singer needs this information to make some decisions by Friday, January 22. This information can be in draft form.
Glenn has filed an EEC complaint. He alleges that Janet Singer is retaliating against him for his interview regarding Janet Edmond’s EEOC complaints against Tim Murphy, Aden Seidlitz and Daryl Pstoria (Pistorius) (Daryl was reassigned to Billings).

[The so-called "team" went in and interviewed a pre-selected group of employees with gripes then tangled and confused just about every issue and fact, and made recommendations even when they weren't asked to. The detail and what followed was supposedly based on this report. There was/is no basis for any of the actions taken by Singer. My performance and customer service levels were higher than any other computer specialist in the Montana Dakotas BLM. The only conclusion is that Singer was retaliating against me for my support of Janet Edmonds and my open condemnation of her collusion with Tim Murphy against Janet Edmonds. The only valid corrective action that should have been a possible consideration would have been something that dealt with my bad judgement in letting my cousin access a government computer without getting him to do the "volunteer" paperwork to make it ok. Would that have been a detail, extended detail, and directed reassignment? Seems like heavy punishment for a trivial and victimless "crime".]

[I appreciate the understanding and support given to me by many of my coworkers and by my peers, the other field office lead computer specialists. I understand fully their need to consider family and career. I was singled out, isolated, and then exiled in an attempt to silence me, but it did not work. I was able to stand alone, though it was tough, but it cost me a career. I have attempted to give Interior/BLM as good as I got. "Bad things happen to good people for a reason…" telling my story has many purposes. I encourage all government employees and especially the Montana BLM employees to unionize (join the AFGE), so you don't have to stand alone.]

Email From: Greg Pedersen To: Glenn Ferren Date: 10/07/99 11:30am cc: Lynne Ridl, Steve Brandenburg Subject: Re: More fun stuff… I feel bad about everything that has happened to you personally and professionally. I wish I could do something to make things right, but in the current climate I am reluctant and unable to jeopardized my family or job status. Time is on our side, things will change, and hopefully the bad apples will die and rot in hell. Keep your head up. We ALL respect that. L8r, Pete
[Thanks Greg, GF] [End of article]
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